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ANALYSIS

Analysis
.
The importance of method in philosopy.
Present methods inadequate because onesided and extreme.
Attention wilt be called primarily to the neglected
elements in knowledge and the knowledge process.
Objection that philosophy needs no special method. But
the fact that science and philosophy formerly were not
distinguished is not a reason why they should not be
so now if found to be distinct ,and the self limitation
cf science makes this distinction real.
There is a real difference between science
and philosophy. Science views its objects
under a special aspect. Philosophy does not.
The field of philosophy does not lie in the
treatment of the principles of science.
Methods in the history of philosophy.
Socrates- -saw the necessity for a methodical procedure.
Plato transformed the induction of Socreies into intuionism.
Aristotle rejected the intuit ionism of Plato and insisted
on the use of analysis
,
primarily.
The Aristotelian metnod supreme in the Middle Ag.. s.
Breaking away from Aristotle --in Bacon.
Bacon's insistence upon an extensile use of induction.
Galileo supplemented the induction of Bacon with the
mathematical theory of motion.
Descartes added to the e the demand for a single highest
principle. His method misused by his followers
culminating in the
; ,<
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GeometricaX metnod of Spinoza.
The critical method of Kant
Hegel and current criticism. Empiricism,
Relation of method to the conception of the reason. It
is necessary to ask what the reason and knowledge are.
The reason an acquisition .
Distinction of faculties as types of mental activity.
The self a unit in knowledge and the intellect holds
a dominant place.
The claims of mystics and other non- intellectualists
are worthy to bo examined.
The relation of the factulties to their source shows
this to be found in an original eomewhat and , differentiated
into act ivi ties , form what we call faculties.
This "somewhat" is not what we call sensibility.
All faculties must be evaluated with reference to this
somewhat
.
Evaluation of the faculties brings us nearer to the center of
our inquiry.
Relation of the intellect to living know led e.
Intel Lectualism in philosophy,
^
The mystics the most radical anti- intellectualists
.
( The anti-intel lectualism of Bergson, Intellect
a falsifying element
;
intuition alone adequate. It
gives reality because it penetrates to the real.
An attempt to state a view of the mind which does not
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necessltate the elimination of any one phase.
The non- intellectual in knowledge is a real element
to which progreos in knowledge is due, mainly.
The chief characteristic is that of discovery.
Analysis the most characteristic work of intellect. It
is most prominent because most tangible and public.
This is aided by the close relation of analysis and
language
.
lure intellect is unreal --an abstraction. There
is an intellectual consciousness but not apart from
other kinds of consciousness.
Reach the heart of the matter only by placing ourselves at
the source of knowledge and the intellect.
This shown by the place of the self in knowing activity.
Essence of knowledge found in this original and
fundamental personal experience of the self.
All intellectualized knowledge is a development from this
by def ini tion, art i cud at ion, etc
.
Knowledge , therefore
,
not merely perceptual though one's
complete knowledge can never be expressed in conceptions.
Bergson's view of the intellect understood from this basis.
The supremacy of this more living knowledge seen in that
which is the basis of all theories : a certain
non-intellectual element of feeling or intuition.
This element is of the nature of conviction.
Original impulse to knowledge of the nature of a demand.
Satisfaction of the needs of the whole self is the
criterion of the knowledge obtained.
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Objection that it is the business of philosophy to
understand. 1'his assumes a certain erroneous view
of what it means to understand. The non-intellectual
in Mr Bradley's philosophy evident
Important to distinguish between the process and the
product of knowledge.
»
The conception of knowledge must be broadened ,then, to
admit such non- intellectual elements as ore effectual in
knowledge
.
Dogmatic rejection of all experiences , intuitions
,
insights , etc is not allowable , "e cannot
exclude without first understanding.
Other categories of knowledge possible.
Keturn to the question of method.
Induction and deduction found to be inadequate. ^alid
so far as they go but do not go far enough.
Analysis also does not go far enough and cannot be
applied directly to the problems of philosophy.
Analysis cannot give us new knowledge. It is inadequate
because it is the instrument of the intellect which is
itself inadequate,
Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction is not
adequate because it seeks the real in the phenomenal.
Defense of Plato and Hegel- neither forsook particulars,
Mr Ward's historical method inadequate because the One
cannot be attained except by a leap- -an intuition.
The "pure experience " of James speculative and superfi cial
*
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The reflective method .
Must recognise the presence of other than merely
intellectual elements in knowledge.
Must include both analysis and discovery. The
characteristic work of the intellect is analysis;
the characteristic work of the more non-intellectual
side of mental activity is discovery.
These two asp cts combined form what may be called the
Reflective Method.
Consciousness and experience form the
starting point in actual thought.
This work will reveal the presence of the
non- intellectual elements in knowledge.
Their significance then must be determined.
The result of the reflective method will be the
recognition of a more living»spiri tual character in
thought and in reality.

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY
.
An essay dealing with the knowing mind and the
methods proper in philosophical procedure ,as
required by the facts of knowledge and the
knowledge process.
I'
THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY.
It is a truism in life that in doing a thing success
depends quite as much on the way one goes about the task as in
the ability which one brings to the doing of it. It is so
in philosophical inquiry. The first impulse to this discussion
is the many ways of doing things in philosophy at the present
time. One man takes his stand beside the intellect and
rejecting all feeling, intuition, interests, and ideals clings
only unto this. Another seises a passing intuition and believes
that he can attain the very heart of the real with the wings of
this fleeting intuition. Btill another- throws himself upon
the first brute fact at hand and clings .ike death to tills,
bidding defiance to every high a priori wind that blows. It
is not so much the diversity of methods , however , that is objectionable
as the extreme ana exclusive manner in which some are held and
the ignoring of important elements in the knowledge process
itself. It is quite probable that the richness and many-sidedness
of reality
,
together with our narrow finite vision, makes it
not only necessary but desirable that there should be many
methods of discovering the real. But it is quite impossible
to me that reality can be found either in mere thought , intuit ion,
or so-called bare fact, as such. For* me, to make any headway
it seems necessary that these various claims be examined and that
a different attitude be taken. Hence I would not discard
all present methods of inquiry or any of them perhaps but the
importance of right method should be insisted upon and present
methods examined in order to find whether there are not grave
defects in our use of them and in their co-ordination which hinder
progress in philosophy. In the end it is largely a question
<
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of viewpoint taken relative to the mind and knowleage. If
some satisfactory and comprehensive view of knowledge can be
found, then the methods will shape or reshape themselves with
reference to that standpoint. As for any essentially new
method I regard that as fairly out of the question, for the
history of philosophy has developed so manifold a way of procedure
and conception that fundamentally new methods are not probable.
After all the Greeks did a pretty thorough business of
developing the conceptions of philosophy. It is to the
unemphasized, the neglected
,
the ignored of human thought and
knowledge that we may profitably turn. Later I shall have
occasion , however
,
to note the wonderful depth of the mind, as
also its comprehensiveness and to suggest the possibilities of
new categories that may be discovered or which may emerge as the
mind grows. For as we shall see, the mind is a plastic thii.g
and capable of unforeseeable growth and expansion , I shall
suggest too, that the time seems to have arrived when attempts to
discover some of such categories may be profitable. But it
a ill only be suggested ,and a radically new or different
theory of the mind is not contemplated. I on ly mean to
examine and to point out some obvious but neglected aspects of
the mind which are quite significant and if developed,! believe,
might lead to radical conceptions.
Of course the importance of method can be over-emphasized.
It is of no great importance in itself but only in relation to the
success of one's undertaking , The greatest gain was made in
philosophy when it became methodical in Socrates, Moreover,
a clearer consciousness of one's method may well prevent an
immense amount of waste labor. And a constant criticism of
I
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one's method and of the instrument and conception of knowledge
is necessary if one would escape pitfalls. The importance of
method is shown in the fact that the development of every one of
the special sciences followed upon the discovery and adoption of
a method.
The objection is made , however
,
that philosophy needs no
method other than those of the sciences . It is said that
those are sufficient for a knowledge of the real, that when a fact
has been looked at from all sides -- as science would look at it--
there is nothing more to be known about it. Science with her
methods can find all there is to be known about the real. If
we must distinguish science from philosophy, these critics would
allow philosophy to deal with the principles of science. But
that is as far as philosophy may go. Of course, it needs, then,
no special method of its own. It is pointed out that formerly
science was not distinguished from philosophy and that they should
not be distinguished now. But that seems no argument, for the
fact that some or all for that matter in the past have not
distinguished them is no reason why they should not be distinguished
by us if they are really distinct. The fact is that formerly
they were not distinguished because the different conceptions were
not what they are today. Science was not at all what modern
science is. Modern science claims to know exactly what it is
about and just how it must proceed. It has not always known it.
The self-limitation of science has only made the field of
philosophy clear in making its own field clear.
There is a real difference between philosophy and science .
When it is said that after we have looked at a thing on all sides
and thus explained it, this is all the knowledge that is possible
about it, one very important fact is overlooked. That fact is

that science by its own self-limitation has deliberately chosen
to look at a thing in its own way and the object as an object forsci
is a special case of the real object. The"sides"of the object
for science do not coincide with the"sides" of that same object
for philosophy. In short, science really does not claim
to look at an object from all sides. Hence the philosopher has
no objection to that statement if sci'ence holds to its own
interpretat ion of what " on all sides" means, and philosophy be
allowed to hold its own interpretation also. There is then no
conflict . Thus science looks at things under a special
aspect only and does not pretend to investigate the real or
ultimate nature of the object. The thing or object appears to
science as a dead thing, a part of a mechanical whole and not
a living object. Even life and live things are considered in
a mechanical way when studied by science. Science thus begins
by assuming a view oi the world which philosophy has never
agreed is the true view. It may not unfairly be said that
philosophy has pronounced a mechanical view of nature false.
But no matter, science cannot take the place of philosophy simply
because begins and holds to a certain view of reality which if
taken in a metaphysical way is quite questionable. The world
for science is not the world as it is but the world as assumed
to be for the purposes of science. To the scientist, for
instance, anything that violates the principle of the uniformity
of nature is not real, but as a matter of fact that principle has
never been scientifically demonstrated nor philosophically
justified. It is assumed and held because it works /because
with it other things seem manageable . The same thing is true
of all scientific principles “-they are abstractions and meant to
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characterize a certain aspect of reality in order to make the
task of science , which is that of description, f ruitful
.
The field of philosophy ,moreover , cannot lie in any mere
treatment of scientific principles. In the first place, they
need no philosophical treatment in the interest of scien ce and
if their philosophical value or truth is to be estimates that
is no concern of science Science is quite able to
formulate its own principles and methods and outsid>e interference
is respectfully declined. It is, In fact, only as scientists
become confused that the philosopher may tell them that they
are outside their field and that there their principles do not
necessarily apply and have no occasion to be applied.
Philosophy was formerly the handmaid of theology but
oome today would make her the handmaid of science. Formerly,
too, the philosopher was sometimes charged by the scientist with
being superstitious and that was offensive =» But now the
charge is that of being unscientific and it is sometimes felt
to be no less offensive and disparaging. If to be scientific
means to be methodical , thorough, exact , and balanced , then every
philosopher should be and wants to be scientific. But if it
means mere-- that we adopt the methods and standpoint of science-
then one ma,\ glory in the infirmity. For in the last analysis
to be scientific after this manner is to be a mere, naturalist in
philosophy --which is really a contradiction if taken strictly,
Philosop deals with the living and with the dead- -if there be
any dead~~and not with the arbitrarily mechanical and
naturalized world. philosophy need not conform to the
principles of uniformity of nature, or of causation in the
scien ific sense or any other scientii ic pri ciple unless it
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find it to be valid for ultimate reality. And if the philosopher
finds freedom to be a fact he need not ask science whether he may
say so or believe it. Hence until scientific principles are found
-and by the philosopher himself - -to be valid for reality, he need
not be coerced by them.
Philosophy should follow the methods best suited to its
own kind of inquiry. There will be no conflict unless someone
gets confused and in that case a healthy fight will often clear
the atmosphere. The danger to philosophy is not that of
conflict but that of supinely drifting into uncritical assumptions
and methods. There is real danger that a weak acquiescence in
the ideals and methods of natural science shall force living1
reality into the background and create an atmosphere hostile to
enthusiasm for a spiritual view of reality. Philosophy
already suffers grieviously from the overbearing rule of a crass
naturalism. Some claim Kant as the destroyer once for all
of metaphysics . But, apart from the question whether he did
so aim in his critical work ,he certainly reinstated. it most
gloriously in his positive doctrine, in his insistence on the
demands of the moral consciousness and in his magnificent
determination that, whatever criticsm had done, the moral
consd. ousness should be supreme and in reality build for itself
a wo rid which should satisfy its own deepest demands upon the
real. There is plenty of need for his spirit in philosophy
both in its critical and its positive significance. There is
need to; for philosophy to assert its right to its "place in the
sun", to insist upon its own field of inquiry and its unquestioned
sovereignty
.
The methods used in the course ol philosophy have been
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various. The Greeks began with plain observation of nature.
The method might be called the inductive though there was hardly
anything methodical in the procedure until Socrates. The sort
of knowledge , then , was the perceptual, With Parmenides
conceptual knowledge had its rise. The method was transformed
accordingly. The development of speculation brought about a
more purely deductive method. Everything was deduced from
an original assumption. In some cases the original first principle
was to be gained by induction and analysis, as in Des Cartes,
i
Then by a misunderstanding of Des Cartes the method of geometry
was applied to the treatment of reality and life. Both
rationalism and empiricism were corrected by Kant who called his
own method criticism. The post-Kantian idealists, in general,
took their standpoint with Plato in the eternal. There is
another , however, which has reeieved less attention in philosophy
but which has been used in all periods of philosophy, sometimes
j
consciously but usually unconsciously. It might be called
the inlui ive method. Here the claim to immediacy , self-certainty
,
etc., find their expression. The mystics have used this method
and they have not been a mere handfull. Those who claim
knowledge through experience, intuition, etc , may be grouped here.
Induction and deduction have been the methods most clearly
formulated and they seemed always to be the ideal ways of procedure.
To be sure there have always been a conflict which is an
apparently inseparable accompaniment of consciousness itself.
Facts seem to be always particular things and never general or
'abstract and yet the general principles seem to be quite as
necessary. Thus the mind is never content to remain among mere
particulars and it often loses itself in the general and abstract.
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It has been thought that one or the other of these must be true
and the other somehow not true. It has , however ,been suggested
that there is some way of viewing them as one, both true and neither,
when taken alone, true. But there was always that opposition
between' proceding from some highest principle which must be true
and from particulars which seem to be real. Neither method, of
course, has ever been used wholly without the other, nor can be
so used. Emphasis or theory have divided thinkers and we have
those called Rationalists , Intellectual! sts ,Empiri oi sts , etc
.
Then, as said, there have always been those who have insisted
that we do not come to reality either by reasoning one way or
the other but by a perception of the real itself, by an immediate
experience or by a oneness with the real. But these latter
have been indulged usually as wayward brothers , romantic is ts
,
mystics, or sometimes as sentimentalists
.
Philosophy became methodical, then , with Socrates. His
method , how ever
,
was limited by the purpose which he had in view.
This was not at all to formulate a system of philosophy. His
interest was more immediatedly practical. The task of
philosophy for him was to formulate conceptions . Obviously
that was the most necessary thing in the beginning of philosophy
and it is the great merit of Socrates to have seen it. Philosophy
can do nothing without conceptions and the Opeeks did tneir work
so well that it has not needed to be done over again,
Plato transformed the induction of Socrates into intuition.
By intuition he reached the Ideas and from there he determined
the content of his world. There has never been in the history
of thought a greater leap- a more daring intuition. Plato took
his stand in eternity and there all idealistic philosophers have
I*
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I
tried to maintain their stand beside him. Modern thinkers
sometimes forget ,however , that to attain that position requires a
leap—an intuition of the soul. Here, then, is an application
of the method of intuition and who shall say that in this instance
the intuition was not a fruitful one and true also.
^ristotle did not like the method of Plato* He
preferred to analyze until the last ground of t ings was reached
and from there to find is way by deduction.. Approximation
to truth satisfied him and he did not believe in taking the soul
upon such a long journey as ^lato had done. It was a difference
in method by which the one highest principle was to be attained.
That principle onee attained all else should be deducible from it.
Aristotle cast his spell over succeeding generations so that in the
Middle Ages philosophical inquiry degenerated into the most
barren logical manipulations.
The breaking away from this spell of Aristotle was in
the interest of nature and the facts of experience. The method
was to be that of induction. Bacon laid down the program of an
empirical .philosophy and insisted on induction and this to
the exclusion of deduction. But he did not carry his method
through in actual practice* He meant to reach general axioms
by means of induction and from there to explain other truth.
But he toe was enmeshed in the formalism of Scholasticism and
thought the task was to discover the simple form of things. And
the method of finding them was to be that of induction.
Then Galileo conceived philosophy as the doctrine of the
motion of bodies and united the mathematical theory of motion
with induction thus making truly remarkable inductions possible-
inductions which almost rival the intuitions of Plato in

imaginative leaps
.
With Des Cartes modern philosophy is usually said to
be in. The influence of methodical natural science upon modern
philosophy has been supreme and with the new impulse of science
in the Nineteenth Century has become quite oppressive . As has
been pointed out, the beginning of modern philosophy is to be sought
in methodical reflection rather than in new conceptions with new
contents. "...It is characteristic of the greater number of
the systems of modern philosophy to seek the path of the real or
’material ' problems by consiaering the science of method and the
theory of knowledge : and in particular the 17th century with
respect to its philosophy may be charactc ized as a strife of
methods," (Windelband, History of Philosophy ,p . 379
. ) It is this
dominance of the methods of natural science which seem to some
to be the present difficulty in philosophy.
Des Cartes added to the contribution of Bacon and Galileo
the demand that the method of induction should lead to a single
principle of highest and absolute certainty from which experience
was to be explained. He will thus find by the method of analysis
the certainty of the being and exisence of consciousness.
Here in the self“intelligible elements of consciousness is found
the fundamental truth. From this everything is to be explained.
Dos Cartes meant to use the method of analysis mainly and
the synthetic only as a method of discovery from one intuition
or intuitive truth to another. But his followers misunderstood
him and mistook the method for the rigid demonstration of Euclid,
This method was fully developed in Spinoza who insisted on attaining
the real by the geometrical method. All reality was to merely
"follow" from a logical principle.
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Empiricism and Rationalism in their extreme form found
a sufficient critic in Kant. he method which he used was that
of criticism- -an examination of the reason itself, of the basis
of knowledge. Here as always a fruitful development in
philosophy was begun by a criticism of the reason itself. The
speculative system following Kant come in for much criticism at
the hands of the present-day ant i - intellec tualists . Hegel
especially is thought to have used a very objectionable system.
It is Sfiid that he began, or pretended to begin, with the One and
determined all else from this abstract One, The nature ox
particular phenomena is determined by the place they have in the
unfolding of the divine spirit. He analyzed the ©ntent of
consciousness and found conceptions which are categories of reality
forms of cosmic life- moments in a single unitary development.
Reality is what it ought to be in this movement , Particulars
must be understood as members of this whole.
It is this treatment of pariiclars and their deduction
from an abstract One which furnishes the basis for contemporary
criticism of Hegel and his followers. Not the whole but the
particulars, say his opponents , are real. And they must be taken
as they are given in perception not as they may be deduced from
a fictitious One, Some demand an historical method by which
the facts of history are taken in their temporality and manifoldness
If any One is reached it must be from there. Experience is to
give us the real and speculation and rationalism are to be done away
Universale ,unities , categories , none of these are wanted. The
brute fact only is of importance. Hence we have radical
Empiricism, pure Experience, and perceptual knowledge.
Conceptions are only tolerated because they are only temporary
I
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makeshifts . Perceptions alone give us the real. Conceptions
blind and confuse us. We suffer them at present because of mens'
infirmities but some day they shall be done away with . Then
shall we see clearly and truly.
We have then in the history of philosophy a number of
methods used, ouch as induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis,
criticism and empiricism. There have been also those who have
claimed to know reality in some non-intellectual, immediate, absolute
manner. These are represented mainly by the mystics. Now
since the question of method is always subordinate to and based
upon the conception of the reason and the knowledge proce-s,
criticism of the usual methods is postponed until theories of
the reason and knowledge are examined. Then when a statement
of viewpoint concerning these io made the proper methoe as well
as criticism of other methods will follow and be based upon that
viewpoint
»
in general the method one uses will or at least should
depend upon the conception of the reason which one has. The
question as to the nature of knowledge should precede that as to
the nature of the real and the way in which one goes about it to
find the real. In fact all philosophical inquiry proceeds
either with .an implicit or conscious conception of the reason
and the method will likely depend upon that conception. Herce
it is necessary that we ask what knowledge is and what the
process of its attainments must be. It is not intended to
give a theory of knowledge in the full sense. There will
be some criticism of the prevailing conceptions of knowledge and
seme suggestions as to what changes should be made in them.
The starting point is the general interest in finning precisely
*-
••
'
what knowledge is and what the knowledge process means. We
know that we know and that we learn to know. But what does
this mean?
The reason is an acquisition rather than an original
possession. Not only are ideas as such not innate but even the
faculties into which we analyze the mind are not, as such, innate.
Reason is developed. Consciousness comes as does the dawn and
is seemingly imposed from without. The first awareness is
perhaps of an other- self. The mind has to learn to control the
body and the outside world becomes a cosmos only with time.
Finally the faculties -as intellect, sensibility, will-- become
distinguished and the mind thinks , feels , wills
,
It is quite
false to say that these faculties make up the mind. The
individual , the -l, the self has them rather than they make it .
As separate and discrete faculties , entities they are abstractions
Te can make the facts transparent only when we say think ,1. feel
I will. The ^ is forever the reality.
is
The use of the term "faculty is not a recognition of
that particular kind of psychology but is used only because it
is convenient. ‘'or practical purposes we may divide the soul
into certain faculties but my contention here is really based
upon the ultimate falsity of any such division. The self
undoubtedly is one and there are faculties only because there
are difierent forms of expression or of action on the part of
the one unitary self. Faculties are abstractions and as such
cannot or should not be held to have real existence. It is the
9
self which is nd this self , under various aspects, as will,
<m
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sensibility, intellect makes itself known to us.
Why, now, do we say that we have such a faculty as the
will? It seems simplest and closest to fact to say that we
are conscious of acting or manifesting or expression ourselves
in different ways. An exercise of volition will come to be
regarded as a typical way of acting. It is a characteristic
mark of mind. But not the only characteristic mark of mind.
We abstract these typical marks and say that the mind has such a
faculty , meaning such a type of action, such a characteristic
manner of expressing itself. These different actions are
capable of classification and distinction . M e name these
faculties.
Intellect , sensibility
,
will as faculties of the soul
are abstractions but they point to something quite real. No
abstraction is real and just because it is an abstraction.
But there can be no abstraction of that which is not. Now
,
these so-called faculties are capable of, in a measure , independent
action, so that a person may reasonably be classed as of the
intellectual type, for instance. Sometimes we find a person who
seems to be almost wholly one type or another. But a person
who would be nothing but one of these would be an abstraction.
The soul can never be just equal to or synonomous with one or all
of its faculties. It never exhausts or transmutes itself Into
a faculty or particular type of activity. They are still "its”
faculties
.
It would be instructive though no. absolutely necessary to
know just how and why the soul conies to develope , thus presenting
such distinguishable ways of acting. It is likely that they
answered, at least in the beginning ,certain purposes of a practical
*«
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sort. The preservation of the organism may have necessitated
just such typical behavior as we find in mental life. Anyway
we have them and we ought to try to understand them ,
Well, we have what we call knowledge and it is a something
gained by an effort and has stages. The stages form process.
If we look back over our mental life we find many interesting
things. We find that when we first began to blink at the sun
everything was in confusion. We were not very consc.ous that
we were confused but we later found that we were. The world, in.
fact, was just a "big , blooming, buzzing confusion". We perhaps
realized the presence and existence of other objects and persons
before we did that of ourselves. We found that when we reached
for a bright object we. reached all over instead of using only
those members which were intended to reach with. We did not
know that there was such a thing as "far" and " near" objects.
Later we learn that all bodies have that character. Then we
find that the physical affects us in certain ways and we have
what we come to call sensations. Then we get percepts , form
concepts and see an object as a particular thing. The world
of nature is "out there independent of us. Later we get tc
questioning or reading some one who has questioned before us and
after a long process of wrestling with prejudices ..beliefs , sense
testimonials we come to the conclusion that the world is not at
all what we thought it was. We must now admit that what we
find to be ideas were wider in scope than we thought and that that
all
was about that we do have. Of course some never find this out
but most who read do. We someday perhaps come to believe that
the reality we know is the reality we make and that is a hard
saying. After all this if we had not been careful we might have
.'
.
.
I
I
gone on and have constructed a system of metaphysics but .even
though we were spared that we have learned that knowledge is a
strange thing and not wholly clear to its matter and manner.
It is _I then who know but 1_ am usually said to be made
up of intellect , sensibility ,and wil] . Knowledge must be a
matter of a faculty since that is what my manner of action is
termed. Then it must be of the intellect. It is very natural
that we should so think and arswer . Indeed we have named it the
faculty of knowledge just because this is the particular function
of the soul which seems most characteristically the activity of
knowledge. Of course there have been those who have thought
that knowledge was only a matter of sense perception. The soul
was merely the recieving board and upon this the sensations
associated themselves in a free manner and thus we have knowledge.
The intellect was then merely a name and not a real function of
the soul— .there turned out not to be a soul in fact. But
Kant and time have helped most people who think past that
partial lar weakness.
But apart from the unfortunate sensationalist there
have been a respectable number of persons who have insisted that
while knowledge is of the earth earthly there is a particular
kind of knowledge which is consummated in heaven and that it is
not a matter of the intellect at all but just in cessation of all
intellectual processes. It is a oneness with the real. Then
some > a very great number to be sure, have insisted that they know
the real in some sort of experience which is other than an intellectual
affair . The verdict has not always, then, for the intellectaalist
,
It is worth investigation.
..
.
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The relation of the intellect to knowledge should be more
clearly defined. But first something must be said as to the
relation of the faculties to their source . It is too easily
accepted that when one has accounted for and described mind as
ini ellect, sensibility ,wi3 1 one has wholly accounted for it. . But
the faculties are developed and differentiated out of an original
somewhat which is the source of thinking, feeling, willing. This
somewhat is personality in the sense of the deepest and most
fundamental reality of the self. It is not a defined , arti culate
,
formulated reality. It is non-relational , a genuine whole which
may be said to be a felt-whole . But it is not feeling as an
affection of the sensibility . It is the basis of the sensibility-
the I, the individuality ,and personality which thi :ks , feels ,wi 11s
.
This it is which has the functions or activities which
come to be known as types in the intellect , sensibility, and will.
Looked at from the side of the acts themselves the mind appears
as intellect , sensibility , and will. But looked as the
_! thinking,
willing, feeling ,it is tills original reality. It is important
to insist that this dif 1 erentiat ion , this abstraction is not a
thing done once for all so that the reality is henceforth the
result of differentiation and abstraction as such. The original
felt-whole is in no way taken up or dissipated. It is not
transmuted into faculties. There is nothing, moreover, pictureable
about this source of all activity. It is not a reservoir but
simply the _I
,
the self. As personality or self it is a living
realit , capable of infinite enrichment and development.
It is necessary also to insist that this somewhat is not
at all what we mean by sensibility or feeling. The sensibility
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is a certain abstraction and differentiation i rom out this
somewhat. It is a relational way of feeling, and a specific
activity directed toward a particular object. The sensibility
has no closer relation nor is it any more like the original
somewhat- than Is the intellect or wil] . This somewhat is neither
sensible , intellectual ,nor volitional. It is that with which the
intellect , sensibility , will must be evaluated.
The question of the evaluation of the several faculties
of the soul brings us nearer to the center of our inquiry , The
discussion will have to do principally with the question of the
intellect and its relation to the more living self. And in
particular to what is called intuition. A prominent tendency
has been known as rationalism or intellec tualism. It has had
many particular forms but these may be ignored. The characteristic
has always been the glorification of the intellect and the
disparagement of feeling and volition. As rationalism if reached
its height in Wolff and its overthrow in Kant. The way of
the intellect is the only way of knowledge. When the power of
the intellect is emphasised to the xtent of ignoring empirical
fact and all non-intellectual demands it is called rationalistic,
and meant usually to be disparaging. But of course all rationalism
is not of the extreme kind and often means merely that we be
rational
.
More recently a strong current of criticism has been
directed against the so-called intellectualism . The most
radical opponents of the intellect as the faculty of knowledge-
have been the mystics. They have always claimed that reality
can be known only in cessation of all intellectual activity.
Its knowledge is a union, a coming into oneness with the real.

It is not sense knowledge nor knowledge of the intellect but a
real perception of the divine. Not only is the actual knowledge
of reality rton -intellectual but there is no possible intellectual
apprehension of this kind of knowledge. One who has really
known the real, after the fashion of the mystic knowledge cannot
say what it was he knew- -it is impossible to put such knowledge in
terms of the intellect. The language was notlawful to be uttered.
One may be inclined to class mystics as non-intellec tually minded
fual
persons, to whom intellect work is distasteful. They are
usually blushed aside .as out of the category of rationally minded
thinkers. But it is a notable fact that the great mystics have
been the keenest intellectualists and the subtlest of dialecticians.
The conclusions of the mystic are reached after an analysis which
is of the most arduous kind but they find after all that the
intellect is incapable of giving true reality and that such is
found in a quite non-intellectual exercise.
Perhaps, the most thorough indictment of the intellect
is that of M .Bergson , He takes his standpoint with life and
finds that the intellect is incapable of comprehending life
because, in the first place, it is not so wide as life being only
a deposit of life and , secondly, it is a positive reactionary
force which would hinder and destroy the true reality. Life is
an evolution and the initial impulse is the source. The
intellect is a slightly retarding factor in this evolution. It
is a falling back, a petrifaction. Besides this upward
movement of evolution there is a second, a downward movement to
which intell ect ; in part , belongs . Moreover, the intellect is not
only a hindering and obstructing element but a falsifying element.
The intellect does no repart truth about reality but that which is
.•
*
.
'
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false, artificial, momentary , And the worst of it is that it
cannot help it, that is its nature. The intellect finds its
natural home among solids and can deal with nothing else. It
cannot know the living but must transform it into the dead, take
snapshots of the movement while the movement itself escapes.
Its view then is external , artificial , arbitrary . Reality is
movement and this intellect can never know though it can give
snap-shots of it. It is thus like the cinematograph, giving only
stages in the flow not the flow itself. Lif e ,movement , escapes it.
It must be emphasized that this knowledge is positively false for
there are no such things as moments in reality ; it is a movement.
The intellect distorts reality.
Intuition, on the other hand, can give us the real.
In Intuition we come into an immediate and real knowledge of the
very heart of reality. This comes in a relaxation of the
intellectual effort ana by a projection of ourselves into the
very movement of reality itself*. The intellect breaks up the
flow of the real into discrete moments but intuition takes us into
the very midst of the movement itself. Intuition is closer to
life-' it is melded after the form- of living reality while the
intellect is molded after the form of inert mat ter, of solids.
Intuition is the real, vital element; intellect the accident, the
ur avoidable . Had the original impulse been strong enough the-
movement would have been completed without reaction , But it
is finite, hence the intellect has to do primarily with the dead
cinders that fall back from the upward movement of fire.
There is a possible view of the mind , however .which may
furnish a means of escape for some of the difficulties without
necessitating such elimination of an element of mental life such
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as the above calls for. This is the view which I wish to
suggest as the basis for the right method in philosophy. There
is evidence in every day life and in the discovery of great truths
of a form of activity which io not merely intellectual. We find
in every day life that the practical guide is in part, a certain
instinctive, intuitional , faith element. We have the experience
of the race; we have fancy, desire, longings, and moral demands,
as also the very important aesthetic demands and interests.
Moreover, ti,ere is in all sucessful thinking an element of other
than intellectual labor. It is to this non-intellectual element
that progress in new truth is mainly due. It is seen in the
familiar fact that intuition often runs ahead of the intellect.
Indeed I do not know but that it always does. It might be
astonishing to know just how much of our more strictly intellectual
work has othe than intellectual demands as its impetus and
how. much our theorizing is really for the purpose of confirming
a belief or some feeling element of our nature. And when we
look at the great philosophers we see evidences that the
impulse to intellectual activity has not been an unmixed intellectual
impulse, Plato was an artist ; Kant a moral hero ; and some
say that Hegel was mystical. At any rate a non- intellectual
element is always present in significant, thinking. Then
advance is often made in intuitive or imaginative leaps rather
than by a closely reasoned provess. Discovery is usually a
leap in the dark . And the attempt of modern idealists to
account for our objective world by an unconscious creation or
cons ruction of the self is quite suggestive. It may be said
that there is never a divorce of this element from the more
strictly intellectual processes. An exhaustive study oi data
f*
...
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is necessary to scientific achievement and the intellectual is
the most noticeable feature but it is surely not the whole of
^
the matter nor the only significant feature.
instinct or fancy or whatnot but it is there and will remain there
whatever it may or may not be and it will not be disposed of by
calling it names.
The chief characteristic non- intel lec tual element on
i
the Side of action is that of discovery. Tne chief characteristic
of the more purely intellectual element is that of analysis.
Analysis is not the whole of the task of the intellect but it
is the most characteristic work. The. intellect analyzes and
defines and this makes articulate the non-intellectual factor .
It takes an intuit ion,for instance, or what we sometimes know as
hypotheses
,
and analyzes them. Private feeling , intuitions
,
etc,, need to b translated into a social language,, or to be
expressed in symbols which are social property. In view of this
relation of the intellectual and the non- intellectual elements in
knowledge it is idle to ask which is supreme , The intellect
is certainly the most prominent, and as to the great body of
scientific knowledge it seems almost wholly intellectual.
But that is partly seeming and would appear somewhat otherwise
if proper analysis were made. For one t-.ir.g, scientific
knowledge is largely of the practical sort. Here the intellect
is an instrument in gaining the needs of life. Science is
I
interested mainly in furnishing a type of knowledge that is
communicable and which by its exactness may be used to meet the
demands of human nature and life. It is thus closely analagous
to language. And the close relation of intellectual analysis
to language helps to give the impression that it is wholly
l.
i
.
-
'
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intel i.actual . This relation to analysis comes about because
analysis is merely to make the subject matter articulate. And
that articulation of meaning is just what language is.
To come to hardest fact, I do not relieve that such a thing
as pure intellect exists at all. It may be possible to abstract
from active knowledge so that some t. ing like mere intellect
may be exhibited but it is impossible to exhibit a purely formal
or intellectual knowledge. Knowledge is a living thing and
while we may abstract we also lose finally all trace of real
knowledge . It is impossible to think merely and at the
same time' really . There is more than the merely intellectual
reasoning . Indeed, in the most subtle and nice discrimination
of abstract thinking there is even an increase in a certain
non- intellectual element so that the whole has a heightened effect,
something like elevation of the spirit, and not wholly unlike
whfct is commonly understood by inspiration. It is true that
quite often the presence cf feeling hinders and obscures reason.
But there is feeling and then feeling and it is not impossible
that in its most refined and purest quality feeling is nothing
blinding and confusing but an illuminating element. It were
better to have another name for this -important fact in the mental
life . It is not a matter of sensibility but of the quality
of life itself— the liveliness oi life. It is of the nature of
insight ,of spirit, personality and indefinable. It is in the
highest ranges of thought that this quality is found to be most
pervasive. Hence the peculiar flavor of admirable intellectual
work. It is a sort of blending of intuition and thought--an
intellectual intuition. It is exhilerating but the exhileration
of a most wonderfully pure and refined atmosphere.
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Of course it is quite proper to say t.^at wo have an
intellectual consciousneso. But it may not be quite sharply
defined as over against other types of consciousness and made
thorough-going ,that i;-. , radical. There is always a fringe,
a margin where they merge and interpenetrate . Some persons
are characterized by one type, some by another, but none are wholly
any one type. They are not mutually exclusive, in reality.
They seem so only in abstraction. For practical and also for
theoretical purposes the division is real and legitimate , but it
is somewhat artificial.
The heart of the matter will not be reached by a mere
analysis of the faculties of the mind. We seek to understand
knowledge but. knowledge is a living thing arid we must not seek
the living among the dead. e must place ourselves not beside
faculties as abstract entities but at the source of these faculties
It does not seem impossible either to take our standpoint there
with the original and living source of knowledge. We have only
to remember that it is after all I who think , feel , and wili,and
that I am neither one nor all of these but the originator of them.
I am conscious of myself as a thinking, fee ling, willing being.
These are my several activities. I am also a living being and
my thinking is a living thinking . We think, of feeling and
acting as closer to that which we call life but just because my
thought is different and perhaps more abstract it is not therefore
a merely abstract and lifeless thing. Thinking is just as much
a living of myself .of my inmost being as is feeling or action
but it is different. Thinking activity t then, is living
activity .
Now, it is this personal, living, spiritual character
f,
-
H is not
.Ot-
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of the thinker that gives character to thought,
that the sensibility interferes with it or la mixed in thinking
but just because it is I, a spiritual person who thinks he has
qualities akin to sense and volition. Because feeling and
volition are also valid expressions of my self. Hence when it
is said that thinking has something of the non-intellectual it
cannot be charged that we are surrendering to a mere feeling,
It can only mean that living t .ought gets the quality of life
from the thinker. Of course many
,
perhaps
,
most people feel
instead of think much of. the time and that, too, where they
should think instead of feel and their rational life is cumbered
with swarms of emotional prejudices and blind inst incts ,but that
does not mean that when thought i3 developed and found alone it
has none of the non-intellectual. It only means that the mind
is not developed rationally.
It is from this standpoint that I may define my knowledge
of reality, I have an original experience of a somewhat that
is, as said above ,undifferentiated , non-relational , a whole and felt
to be such. In itself it isjakin to feeling but a feeling
which goeo beyond itself. Its chief character and reality
is an ideal one. It is that with which all thi .king whatever
begins and with which all ends, for the matter of that. It is
inseparable from my innermost self or personality and it is also
the only reality that I know. My experience or consciousness
is knowledge and of the living kind. It is the essence of my
knowledge of the real and remains forever the essence ot all
reality. It cannot be got behind and is unanalvzable .
It is undefined excepting to a small aegree , inart iculate ,unformulated
,
incommunicable as it is. But all our science and the results
f
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of all our intellectual labor is only the definition of this,
the formulation into social signs so that it may not only be
communicable and shared but that it also may be a definite thing
to me. I experience,! live it, I am in my deepest self just it.
The mass of the worlds knowledge, the innumerable and
unnameable systems of thought
,
the horde of definitions and
co ceptions are just the result of the attempt of the mind to
comprehend in conceptual form this original somewhat. which
means that it is the deepest fact of personality in the act of
expressing itself. Now those who would limit all kn wledge
to the perceptual and who find in conceptual knowledge only a
distortion of reality are only arguing for the making of this
felt knowledge the whole of our knowleege. Of course that
which we habitually call knowledge is incomplete and shall always
be so simply because the real is not resolvable into the forms
of the intellect. The mind will never lose itself in one of
its faculties for the mind is life and life is reality.
No theory is sufficient, no conception is adequate once for all
to express what I know to be the real. We do accept theories
more or less and sometimes find conceptions which seem to meet
our approval but they will not always do so, because life will
sooner or later break the arbitrary Units thus set it. Thus
the endless search for the eternal wears on. It is the task
of life and perhaps of the real itself to thus come to expression .
But we human beings will never and do never know what it is to
define
,
to formulate, to express in conception that which for us
is real except at the price of some of the richness and liveliness
and immediacy of what we know to be the real. The deepest
somehow escapes our conceptions and if we fool ourselves for a
f'
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time we shall some day come to knew our mistake.
We may see now why it is that the intellect takes only
snap-shot views of the real, why its knowledge is artificial , false,
external, why the living escapes it. We may refute the extreme
expression of this view but we shall never refute the deep insight
into the knowing self which the view itself indicates. The
intellect is in its very nature inadequate to give us reality as
it most really is in its wholeness , because it is precisely the
task of the intellect to present the real to us, to define it, to
formulate it, to translate it into a social language; but life
,
reality is forever more than a formula, a conception, a particular
articulate thing. The intellect is just the faculty we have
to make this attempt to make reality a public or social possession.
There is no sense in deriding the intellect. It does its work
most efficiently and it is absolutely necessary and a valid and
vital form of our life. But it is made for and serves a
special purpose and the nature of its task makes it forever
impossible to quite succeed in what it sets out to do. There
are lots of contradictions in conscious life but this is a very
significant contradiction. This is the contradiction and the
tragedy of finite selfhood. Personality itself is,ae we know
and value it, ^product of this process and the process will yet
more and infinitely more enrich personality. All that we have
of articulate selfhood , all that is significant about us as social
being, is due to this fundamental effort of the self to make itself
clear to itself in conceptions. in this process the coarser
elements of the personal and social life will fa3J away and
refinement will grow with enrichment and efficiency. Rational! /at
i
4
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cf life is the very development of personality itself and it
is also the revelation of reality and the growth of intellectual
efficiency, of aesthetic appreciation, and of moral power, the
coming of one to one’s self, to the true reality, or better, the
coming of the true reality to finite selfhood.
The supremacy of this more original and fundamental
knowledge of the living spirit is seen in the quite obvious fact
that our theories and accredited conceptions of the real are
dependent upon this fundamental, attitude of the soul for their
acceptance . Much of the theoretical work is dene to make
articulate and define what is sometimes a belief. No theory
that contradicts the living faith of humanity can long find
acceptance. The soul demands that the intellect formulate a
satisfactory theory. All theories about reality have their
source and warrant , then, in this fundamental attitude of the mind.
In the last analysis all tneory is traceable to this source as the
intellect itself finds its source there. Here is the last
ground for our practical certainty and for fruitful labor. Life,
then, is the source of theory and not theory of life
;
it is
greater than theory and logic and opposed to the merely theoretical
or logical.
.The fundamental attitude is of the nature cf conviction.
Conviction is something like a felt certainty but it is more.
It is a positive demand, the demand of one's deepest self. It
is this sort of thing that is the arbiter of theory . Every
theory about the real finally, if analyzed, reduces to some such
an attitude or conviction. Reality is what it ought to be and
what our deepest demands insist that it shall be. The rule of
conviction means th it theory shall square with life , It matters
I*
not How rational one may become, this positive attitude of the
soul is fundamental and mandatory. But it is not opposed to
reason, as such, or to theory. It is only the conflict of life
and artificiality , inadequacy .formality , etc , It means that the
living knowledge of the soul is ultimately the true knowledge of
the real
,
The original impulse for all knowledge seems to be of
the nature of a demand. In its early stages at least it is
mostly practical. The intellect itself may well have been
developed in answer to a practical demand or need, perhaps of a
social nature , I n general, the nature of the demand which lies
at the basis of knowledge is a demand for some sort of satisfaction
or a fulfillment of a need . There are somewnat superficial
and capricious demands arising from the different sides of our
nature but this fundamental demand is none of these , It is
deeper than these. It is a demand of my deepest self. As
this need becomes more conscious , more articulate it appears as a
particular need. It is the work of the intellect to make that
need and the demand articulate. As formulated it is something
less than the whole need for it is a demand of the deepest and
widest of interests. It is the demand of the whole nature
though wholeness not in the sense of a summation of particular
elements of my nature. It is the demand of personality ,of the
original felt -whole of my personal life, of my being.
Now, I shall know that I possess the real when I am
satisfied. My satisfaction is not that of mere caprice or of
thoughtless wishes, but of my life. My dissatisfaction is really
an indication of my ignorance, I shall never know reality,
however, completely because my dissatisfaction is radical and
**
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strikes at the roots of the real self. I demand to come wholly
to myself, to comprehend what I know and am in my real self. But
the way in which I am to do that is of such a nature that it can
never be complete, for to do so would be the comprehension of
ultimate reality. And that by a special activity of the self
,
such as the intellect would be the very negation of reality.
I do however find relative and temporal satisfaction. I find
relative knowledge and a knowledge which for a time seems fairly
adequate . But just as I seem to be at rest and my needs seem
to be fulfilled the infinity of my life surges up within me and
I am again tossed about ir. the sea of doubt, the unknown and the
unattained. I become a dissatisfied self. Such is life.
It is manifestly somewhat of a contradiction and a good deal of a
tragedy but it is life .
It is objected that the business of philosophy is to
understand and that the intellect is all that needs to be satisfied.
We have other needs and dissatisfactions and demands of other
sides of our nature but these have no reason to appear in the
court- of philosophy. Nov/, it is, of course , surely the business
of philosophy to understand . But it is assumed here that
understanding is purely an intellectual affair. That does not,
however, seem to be the case if the view of knowledge and the
intellect here suggested has any truth. The contention is true
if philosophy.be taken in a narrow enough sense. If we mean
by philosophy a formula of reality, a system of concepts, then of
course the one necessary thing is that that system 1 e intellectually
consistent. But this has to do with the formal side and not
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the actual live knowing of reality. r hilosophy as completed
product is an affair of the intellect because a product or intellectual
work but philosophy as an actual process of gaining insight into
the real is far from being a merely intellectual affair.
Mr Bradley insists that the philosopher understand and
if he have any but the purely intellectual in his philosophy
he has left his field. This , however
,
is just our problem.
The contention of this essay is that there are other elements
always present and moreover that they are valid. One will seek
in vain for a philosophy that does not show the presence of such
non-intellectual elements. They actually uo p t.ay a part and to
deny or ignore them is arbitrary , Spinoza attempted to work
out a rigidly geometrical system yet the source of all his effort
was in the passion of the soul and not in t ;e pure intellectual
demand for a logical system of philosophy. Mr Bradley’s w.ole
system is th8 satisfaction of a den and which is,however, not wholly
intellectual > A mysticism pervades the whole of it and the
fact that he insists upon consistency in the finished product is
not a proof that in him the intellect is alone at work in his
philosophy. He begins by rejecting important things because
<
to the intellect a.s such they are contradictory ,but he ends with
the confession tnat we can know the real only in feeling, '‘Nothing
in the end is real but what is felt and for me nothing in the
end is real but that which I feel.” (Appearance ,
-p . 190
. ) Again ,
"in one sense I agree that we never can break out and pass beyond
feeling. Everything that is real must be felt. "(Reality and
Truth, p . 157 ) . Now, if philosophy is to give us the real and
nothing in the end is real but that which we feel then feeling
cannot be absent from the reality which the philosophy gives.
I^
'
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That is, feeling enters into my knowing. The consciousnes . : which
is present in my knowledge of reality is not a purely intellectual
consciousness. But Hf this element is present how am I to deny
that it is a part of a knowing process?
As to what we finally call real and true, Mr Bradley
takes a position not wholly unlike the one taken above , namely
,
the real and the true are what satisfies the demands of our nature.
He denies that any part, of our nature except the intellect may
claim recognition but does admit that they do get recognition
indirectly --that is, through the idea and the intellect . But
we have insisted that that is just the office of the intellect--
to find a satisfying answer to our demands. " An actual object ”,
he says, "fails to satisfy us, and we get the idea that it is
incomplete and that a complete object would satisfy us. IV
e
attempt to complete our object by a relational addition from
without and by relational distinction from within. And the
result in each case is failure and a sense of defect. «e feel
that any result gained thus, no matter how all inclusive so far
would be less than what we actually experience. Then we try the
idea of a positive non-relational whole, which contains more
than the object and in the end contains all that we experience.
nd that idea,--- seems to meet out demands (Real! ty and Truth, p . 188 )
.
Further," the contradictory and the meaningless fail to be true
because in a certain way they do not satisfy. They produce a
special kind of uneasiness and unrest; and that on the other side
which alters this unrest into an answering contentment is truth".
(Ibid,p.l.) Thinking ,he holds
,
consists in the pursuit of a
certain kind of satisfaction - • intellectual satisfaction.
.X
'
.
I
But now the point is what does an intellectual satisfaction
include and what does it finally mean. Mr Bradley admits
that other elements of our nature reel eve satisfaction indirectly
through the intellect. Is it possible for the intellect to
satisfy itself with unsatisfied dem nas of our demands pounding
away at its doer^ Can we sc isolate cne phase of our activity;
meet its demands without meeting those of other phases? To
me such a claim is not only false but vicious. For it is
impossible to think of intellect as in any sense independent
of the deepest self or as any thing but an organ of that self.
It is an instrument and it exists primarily in the interest of
the self , Of course there are interests and satisfactions
which are mainly intellectual. But I cannot believe that if
the philosopher does not enter the search for the real with his
whole self and with all his powers that he is likely to find it.
Some superficial phases of philosophy may be enjoyed, us the
mathematician enjoys building the worlds which he may ,but such
is not true philosophy, I do not doubt ,moreover, that the
demands of my moral nature ..for instance, get satisfied in idea
and through the intellect but the fact that the intellect i.o
finally to solve my philosophical problems and bring satisfaction
does not mean any thing to me except that that is its natural
and special function. It is the instrument by which balance
and harmony is restored, though I am glad that the real as it is
in me constantly destroys that balance and harmony and thus ensures
that I shall not become a merely artificial being.
The terms " uneasiness" and "unrest 1 do not apply to a
pure intellect. Uneasiness and dissatisfaction involve
feelings of some sort. There can be nc "intellectual demands"
• V-
'
of a pure nature because a ’’demand" involves ether than an
intellectual element. A demand is always an assertion of will.
I cannot see, then, from the above that Mr Bradley himself , though
he insists so much on philosophy as understanding, really holds to
his ideal. After condemning so m'uch,even the self, as being
intellectually inconsistent
,
he turns , in his positive exposition,
always to feeling, experience , and teaches that feeling in the end
as in the beginning is that in which we know the real, though
feeling in the end is not non-relational, undif ferenti ated feeling
of the beginning, having been pierced by relational contradictions
and finally becoming supra-rel&t icnal and in this sense the source
of the t ue and the real. To Mr Bradley the use of the
intellect discovers only contradictions and impossibilities.
It is only when the intellect and all relational kinds of being
are transmuted into something higher that feeling, pu :ged of the
relational inconsistencies into which it fell
,
becomes the only
means of coming into contact with reality. He is really not
so far from M, Bergson as might appear.
There is an important distinction between the process
and the product of knowledge. The process is a most living
activity, in which all powers of the soul are engaged and rightly
so. The faitojthe conviction, the felt need or dissatisfaction
is there and the mind through the instrumentality of the intellect,
mainly, sets about to meet these demands. It is not however
merely an affair of the intellect. The driving force of the
soul is behind the intellect and its very activity is pervaded
by the presence of these powers. Now , if it is meant that
the process should go forward in an intellectual manner, that the
intellect should not be overwhelmed by the emotional power of the soul,
ri
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but should be allowed to keep the field clear it is an intellectual
process. But it may easily be forgotten here that the Intellect
is only an instrument and that the demand for purely intellectual
work is the demand for the most efficient use of this instrument.
The intellect does , however
,
forever remain an instrument-- an
instrument of the soul. If, further
,
to be philosophical mea s
that the result of this work should be clearly and consistently
harmonious after the manner of the intellect it is not conceded
that the whole of philosophy is a purely intellectual thing.
For this which we call philosophy is a specific kind of activity
and product. It is a formula ,a system of reality. Eut
now the actual process of obtaining this is not merely intellectual
except that the intellect is the instrument chosen for a .. ork
which is in itself more than intellectual. Or if it mean
that philosophy is merely a playing of a game then it should be
a purely intellectual game. But philosophy is not a game.
If by this is meant that the game should be played well it
amounts to saying only that the instrument, of knowledge should
be used effectually ,whi ch is admitted. And it if it be
remembered that search for the real on the part of the philosopher
is a search of the soul for its own complete self and that by
its very nature the intellect is the instrument formed for that
specific purpose, then little more need be insisted upon. For
ti.is means that the knowledge process is a living process and
that the knowledge acquired is a knowledge of the soul. The
fact that the nature of human life requires a communicable
knowledge and that the self chooses to come to itself by an
intellectual process will notblind one to the presence of other
than intellectual elements, nor make on intellect an exclusive
. .
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faculty which can know a reality which i., more than intellect
and that without the aid of other elements of the mind itself.
The task of philosophy as conceived by ^ocrates is
suggestive here. To d eve lope conceptions is the more formal
aspect of philosophy , We are interested in finding conceptions
by which we may make clear to ourselves and comr unicable to others
the meaning of the instinctive demands of our nature. As already
seen, the intellect is just the faculty or type of activity by
which the original and fundamental felt-somewhat becomes articulate.
It becomes articul te by the formation and expression in conceptions.
This, then, is much the life history of the soul and it is an
eternal process. That which is real and true for us becomes
expressed or symbolized by certain conceptions. But soon those
become inadequate and finally the bonds are broken and there the
endless task returns cf forming new conceptions by which to make
articulate this increased experience* Nov/ one may call this
nore formal production of conceptions philosophy and the system
of concepts which stands for the real .a philosophical system .
But it is plain that it is somewhat superficial. The real
process is more inclusive. It includes the bursting of the
bonds of concepts and the surging of life and activity of new
experiences. The two go hand in hand anc are .in reality one
and not two. Hence the knowledge of reality is not either but
both, or better, the whole movement of life.
Aside from the inherent inability of the intellect to
comprehend the real and in its nakedness to give us reality and
an understanding of it, it is not at all apparent that an
understanding of life and of reality is merely the property of
the philosopher. Indeed it most certainly is not. It is
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not so easy to define the way in which a philosopher knows and
the way others not philosophers know. The philosopher
developes a special way of trying to understand life and reality
and yet there is nothing new and nothing quite different from
that of the ordinary man. The philosopher is more systematic,
more thorough ; reflective most of the time where the ordinary
person is reflective little of the time. It is the philosopher s
business to understand reality but if that mean merely to
intellectualize he has , in the first place, missed the true
meaning of underslanding and , secondly , condemns himself to
barrenness and penury of knowledge.
To sum up, then. we have insisted that even if the
understanding were merely an affair of the intellect this can
never be satisfied so long as my nature as a whole or any legitimate
part of it demand satisfaction » The intellect is not distinct
as a faculty , above and Irresponsible to my deepest self. but it is
the orgain of my self and its purposes. If there is a dissatisfaction
in my being it will find its expression in the intellect. Indeed
that is precisely the business of the intellect --to bring peace
and harmony and to fulfill the needs of my dissatisfied and
partial self. It is true that the satisfaction of my deeper
self comes indirectly through the intellect but that only in part.
It may be that the way of the intellect is not the only way
toward satisfaction though of course it is the only philosophical
way. But just because the intellect is what it is in relation
to the self or soul it can never be merely a separate faculty.
It can have no needs which are purely of itself. Ultimately
they hark back to the deeper self which is their source and
the ai biter of their fulfillment. There can be no purely
— —'
I
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intellectual demands or any purely intellectual satisfaction
simply because there is no pure intellect.
In what way, now, shall we proceed if we are to gain
knowledge? Well, at least the usual conception of knowledge
should be somewhat altered and factors admitted as determining
elements which have before been excluded. It has bo n assumed
that knowledge is solely an affair of pure intellect and the
deliverance of pure intellect constitutes knowledge . Of course
if the conception of knowledge be arbitrarily limited to an
affair of some faculty of the mind then the intellect should
undoubtedly be given the credit. But knowledge cannot be thus
limited. A faculty of knowledge is a useful and legitimate
abstraction but to set it u. as quite real in its own right is not
justifiable - » The proceedure usually has been to acknowledge
the deliverances of the intellect as the /.hole of knowledge-- it
having been already assumed to be the faculty of knowledge-- and
then the intellect has been set up formally as the seat and
instrument of knowledge . The fact that the intellect is
never free from the presence of non-intel lectual elements has
not been noted or sufficiently attended to and. then, in view of
the fact that intellect thus supplemented by other elements has
been eminently successful, has given rise to the natural opinion
that knowledge is purely a matter of the intellect, Moreover,
the fact of the immense practical results from intellectual
activity
,
particularity in the sciences, togei er with the fact,
that all communicable or social knowledge is an intellectualized
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knowledge
,
has led to the belief that the intellect Is the sole
instrument of know led,
c
As a result of this as sumption, the /.hole of life and
experience which have not been clearly matters of inte lect have
been relegated to the field of romance , religion, or some other field
where the intellect is supposed not to be supreme. A great
body of significant facts and experiences of life have been
rejected often in a very dogmatic manner. When ideals of life,
ethical , religious , and aesthetic demands as well as experiences of
great personages
,
and the catholic interests of the race have
insisted upon recognition, they have usually be.:n acknowledged
as of some sort cf value but not for the knowledge of reality „
The mystic has maintained that he has a knowledge of reality which
is non-intellectual but philosophy has largely ignored his claim.
How often in the history of philosophy has the mystic been given
serious consideration? Not very often. Yet he has been very
numerous and he has never been surpassed in intellectual power.
Thus it has come about that important doctrines in philosophy
are lightly set aside as mystical and therefore not profitable
or worthy of consideration.. It is even a favorite way of
dismissing a person and his doctrine by merely saying that he is
mystical, or that this particular phase of his philosophy is a
product of mysticism. Such a method is of course the very
essence of dogmatism. And it is just this type of dogmatism
which thio essay aims to protest against. It matters little
whether the final result should show that none of these t ings
have a claim to affect the knowledge process but it does matter
that they should be merely assumed not to do sc. Philosophy
has followed natural science here and assumes that such things
.f
^
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asffeeling,mysticism,religious and aesthetic experiences have no
standing because seemingly not amenable to treatment by the
methods of science. Now, it ^eems to me reasonably probable
that such elements as religious and aesthetic experiences, ethical
demands , feelings, longings and aspiration may furnish an
important element in the knowing of reality. It must not be
forgotten that the task of knowing reality is infinite and that
the manifestations of the real are innumerable » The manifoldness
of the real as expressed in life is incomprehensible. It is
idle to say that they may not all be vastly significant. The
tendency of the intellect to run into barren formalism is
notorious and it has always, I think, been prevented from doing so
by the presence of other than intellectual elements. Life
has often saved us from intellectual fruitlessness. If we are
to know reality no phase of human experience may be ignored.
Instance the case of the genius. It is admitted
that he has an infinitely deeper insight into life and the real
than the ordinary person, What is the nature of that insight?
What is its significance? Take Jesus as a religious genius.
How came he by the knowledge of life and men that he showed?
To say that he was a genius does not explain. What is the
secret of genius? That it is not merely or mainly hard work
is plain, though the genius may work harder than any one else.
Take any great artistic genius. He too has knov^ledge. How
came Beethoven by his masterpieces? • we have a transcription
of notes or signs. But what was ana is the real inner fact?
Again hon did Shakespeare with his restricted knowledge of the
world get such an almost incredible knowledge of the world and
men? He was a genius but also a man and human. Have we
p
any right to ignore such types of knowledge merely because it
is unusual?
After recalling these great minds the question of what
knowledge is and how we came by it is more bewildering than when
we are thinking about the ordinary mind. We think we know
what scientific knowledge is and we are inclined to make it the
only valid knowledge. It is almost comparable to the attempt
to set up a standard of religious or artistic experience. But
we know that scientific knowledge is not the only knowledge.
And we know that the knowledge of a genius —of a Jesus or a
Beethoven- -is not what we like to call knowledge. Some say
that it is insight and that philosophy does not want insight or
at least not insight merely.
Suppose one does call the knowledge of the genius
insight. How does that help us to understand his knowledge?
If we cannot find the goings of it how can we reject it, for we
should do so not knowing what, we were rejecting. And until
every such kind of knowledge is resolved and understood it is
sheer dogmatism to reject it as being unphi losophical . Of
course it is not p a losophical until it is philosophically
usable, *>ut the point is that it ought to be used if it has
any value. 'A'e cannot intelligently exclude until we have
understood. And what philosophy wants is knowledge of the
real. If we say it does not want merely insight we speak as
though we knew just what the limits of insight are. Do we?
Now when one thinks of the genius one hesitate.-, to restrict the
mind to certain categories of knowledge. One wonder, whether-
the experiences of great personalities and of the race as a whole,
the great interests and demands of life may hot indicate the
Q
r
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presence of categories which ought to be uncovered and m stered
before we can advance in certain knowledge of reality. we may
wonder if the mind as intellect is not a special case of the mind
as knowing. An investigation of experience in its widest
extent should find it to be so. I should never accept any man’s
experience as to what reality is but his experience may help me
to know what the mind itself is
,
and to know perfectly what the
mind of man is is to know what reality itself is.
With the conception of the reason and the knowledge
process, just indicated, in mind we may return to the more specific
examination of method. It will be necessary to point out what
use may be made of present methods, to point out their failures,
and finally to suggest a conclusion based upon this and previous
considerations
.
With regard to induction, very little needs to be said.
It cannot stand alone and apart from deduction it is of no value
and indeed is impossible. When the method was first brought
forward in modern times by Bacon recognition of nature was sorely
needed. The particular fact of experience may never be
ignored. They could not be if one desired it. But the claim
that by induction one can arrive at a single highest principle,
or the simple , essential form of t.-ings is misplaced. We are
not needing a highest principle or a simplest form. What we
need is to arrive at meaning and that is something other than a
principle or a form. The existence of a highest principle is
an abstraction and in itself will explain nothing.
Deduction, in itself, is equally inadequate. Granted
a highest principle, any amount 01 deducing m ;y or may not be
illuminating. Certainly the real cannot be deduced ^rom principle.

It is quite possible for the mathematician to build a world of
form and it may be done in a logical manner but it has no claims
to existence. As a method ,of course, deduction is never found
apart from induction. Both are quite legitimate and natural
methods of mental procedure. We cannot think without using
them. They are thus and so far valid methods. But nevertheless
in themselves, even when found together, they are inadequate .
Reality cannot be found by any amount of induction or deduction.
Reality is not deductible from a principle. It is not a mathematical
formula nor is it amenable to complete statement in terms of such
formulae. Both methods assume that reality has a certain form
which lends itself to the use of a particular method. But we
cannot do in philosophy what is successfully done in science , that is
,
assume that reality is of a certain, nature or structure and by
cutting Questions to it determine whether it is as assumed beforehand
to be. Uniformity of nature may be assumed and then phenomena
isolated and questioned so that the assumption seems c rifirmed.
It should be poi. ited out, however, that of course one cannot really
arrive at a complete induction establishing the principle of the
uniformity of nature. It is a hypo thesis, a guess , a veritable
leap f -an intuition.
Wow, you cannot isolate ultimate reality and perform an
experiment upon it and thus determine whether 1 your assumption be
true or not. The conclusion of the scientist is always subject,
to a certain well defined limitation and the knowledge is knowledge
only within these limitations. There is no induction not
deduction of ultimate reality.
After the conception of the reason and the place of the
intellect suggested above, we shall be able to criticise the method
.'
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of analysis. This was the method, we saw, by which Des Cartes
hoped to reach positive and sure results in philosophy. It is
always necessarily found together with synthesis but synthesis
may be made at least to appear to perform a fairly subordinate
work. Des Cartes reached by analysis what he thought an
absolutely certain and fundamental principle. He did find
that it is necess >ry to assume a unitary self. Now, without
doubt"I think" but this was as far s this method of analysis
would lead. That I am and that I think seem certain, but it
is less certain that I am sure that I am because I think.
That I am is assumed when the analysis is begun and it is not
the analysis which proves the assumption to be correct. It may
only reveal it, A moment of reflection will assure all that
is needed here. Moreover* when the analysis is complete,
all else but the certainty of the self is not a matter of analysis.
Des Cartes here brought in intuition , synthesis . The method
of analysis will not apply to the reality as such. The results
of analysis are valid, of course, so far as they go. And as
said of induction and deduction it is a necessary form of
procedure. But it is not sufficient as a method of philosophy.
No amount of analysis will reveal ultimate reality.
It will not do tuis because analysis is the characteristic work
of the intellect and shares the limitation which we have found
the intellect to possess. ’Ye find, usually at the end, that
something has escaped it which is necessary for the complete
conception of the thing itself. Analysis will reveal the
articulations of the real but the intuitional synthesis of
is needed
Des CartesAto complete the process. Analysis can bring order
out of chaos, can make distinct and definite but it cannot push out
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into the untrodden regions of the real. Tt is exactly the
work of the intellect and the work of the intellect is not to
discover. If analysis, it would mean that the real is
capable of intellectual formulation
,
of being completely expressed
in conceptions , of being pressed into the hard and artificial lines
of an articulate system. That we do not believe is possible.
Analysis is inadequate because of the inherent and necessarily
inadequate character of the intellect. The intellect, as we
have found, has this limitation because it is an instrument, a
product of the real itself.
The most original and successful attempt of the present
day in this direction is ' that of Husserl. He calls his
method that of phenomer alogical reduction, The reason why
I do not know what the table ,for instance, is is because I am not
in the right attitude or position relative to it. I am not
rightly adjusted to it. An object looks different to me when
I occupy different positions relative to it. The coming to
know it then is merely one of adjustment. If I get adjusted
properly, to this table we may say, then I shall know it as it
really is, as it is in its complete reality. The problem is
one of adjusting myself to my object. The object is real.
It is not real , however, as I now see it perhaps. Its reality
is not that of particular* tables but of table . There is the
table which is the real table and if I adjust myself properly I
shall know the real table. The method , then , is that of reduction
f
of phenomenal reduction. Consciousness has already been so
reduced and found to be merely a matter of adjustment. Other
may be likewise reduced and are expected to be.
The trouble with' this ,for one thing, is that it is seeking
(m
f
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the real in phenomena merely . Of course he insists that the
real is actually to be found there but all who have ever started
in to analyze particular have either ended with much less than
the original fact or they have transcended it
,
and find themselves
trying to understand the particular from the viewpoint of the
eternal. Of course objects appear difierent to me in different
positions but most obj.ct come to have a certain, more or less
exact
,
physical reality and we accept certain 'adjustments'* as
giving us the real object in its phenomenal aspect. It would
seem to be a far cry from this comparatively simple process of
adjustment and an adjustment which would give us the ultimate
reality of the object. Reflection upon particular things
always drives us to reflection on consciousness itself. And
when the actual reality of consciousness is observed something
beside analysis and reduction seem imperative. Analysis of a
particular thing ,even of this table, will ev.entuaJ.ly drive one
into speculation and the ultimate reality of it will finally be
not reduced phenomena or analyzed object but constructed reality.
The procedure and doctrine of post -Kantian idealism is
known by its opponents more particularity as intellectualism and
felt to be scorn ething very bad indeed. The complaint is made,
in general, that experience , facts
,
parti culars , have be_n ignored
and that philosophy thus becomes barren . The One is assumed
and the Many are deduced from the One, Opponents claim that
the Many are never reached in this way, that we are left with a
,r block-universe" on our hands. And such a reality is very
disappoint ing to lovers of particulars and facts, Hegel is the
arch-offender in this regard , according to the champions of
"experience" and "facts . Plato is also an ofiender. Now
P
.
.
it is worthy of remark that in the case of each of these there
was a noteworthy practical aspect and attention to experience.
In a certain respect it was the crowning attempt of Plato to make
his philosophy serve the Greek nation ir_ a very practical way.
It is true that he took his viewpoint in a non-temporal world.
He was not a temporalist and that is what many modern writers
in defense of experience would be. But notwithstanding Platoo
idealism he did not disregard fact , experience , or particulars.
It would be more just to Plato to say that he understand particular
facts so well that he knew their explanation could not lie in
themselves. Those who are so insistent upon attention to
particular facts- of experience are not always conscious of the
probable fact that their failure to see the justification of an
idealistic viewpoint is just that they themselves do not see
deeply into those particular facts. It is not just to great
idealists such as Plato to say that they forsake facts for
barren speculation.
Now something of the same thing is true, it seems to me,
with Hegel and post-Kantian idealists in general, Hegel did
take his viewpoint in an other than purely factual position.
And his method no doubt is justly condemned in many respects ,
But those critics who reject Hegel in a wholesale manner do not
realize all that that rejection ,veans. Hegel ,as did Plato,
placed himself in the eternities and viewed the world from there.
He may have been arbitrary in some degree but when it. is supposed
that, he merely ignored experience purely out of love for abstraction
it is unjust. Like Pluto and like most idealist, s he saw the
absolute necessity of viewing things
,
facts of experience , from a
higher standpoint t.an mere sense experience. A thing,he saw,
was in itself quite impossible of comprehension. He saw
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particula rily the insoluble contradiction of consciousness,
found himself forced to transcend particular facts in order to
explain fact but his aim, as that of Plato, was to understand fact.
If the particular way in which he conceived those facts was
unsuccessful it is not therefore true that he left them out of
distaste for them.
Mr Ward has taken considerable pains in "The Realm of
Ends" to point out that Hegel actually did be_in with the many
of experience and that therefore his method was artificial.
Mr Ward insists , therefore, that one must always begin with the
many and gradually progress to the one. Now, no one will deny
that Hegel did not begin with an absolute One and that he did
begin with the manyness f experience. And yet , such criticism
may not be altogether correct. Who can say that one begins in
philosophy with the one or the other? It is certainly true that
the mind does not come to know many things and then one or visa
versa . The terms are correlative and the comprehension of
manyness and oneness advances together. Where in the history
of the mind one is more prominent than the other might be hard to
decide . Certain however that the reason for one choosing the
one or the other as philosophy is the result of a life of
accumulating feelings
,
ideals
,
instincts , and desires , •Hien one
sits down to write a philosophy one does not begin then to choose
what sort of philosophy one shall write, i’he choosing is made
in great part befoe . One certainly does not , how ever , begin to
be bothered first by an abstract One, but rather by the concrete
Many of one's life. No one supposes that Hegel was not forced
into his thought by a particular fact or facts of experience.
But, as said above, he was forced beyond these for an explanation*
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It is idle then to think that because by our very nature and
environment we are chiefly concerned at first with concrete
particulars of experience and that we, in a sense, begin there
,
that the Plato who discerns almost intuitively the absolute
impossibility of understanding these facts in themselves and is
forced to a grand intuition, that su h a one is therefore forsaking
experience and fact.
Mr Ward offers what he calls a "historical method" for
philosophy. But where do we fii.d a more passionate lover of
history than Hegel was or who has ever conceived history so
comprehensively and grandly as did Hegel, as a movement of spiritual
life, of divine mind. To exp.ain history was his greatest
interest and it is not wholly necessary to explain it correctly
to prove himself appreciative of it. Mr Ward and other critics
of Hegel desire a more spiritual view of the world but it was
Hegel who gave philosophy a spiritual view of the world and of
reality in the face of the philosophical naturalism of his day.
We may object to his method but one looks in vain for a more
glorious vindication of the spiritual conception of the real.
Of course there was much that was barren in his system but
nevertheless the need of today, when the methods of natural science
are so supreme in philosophy , of such spiritual conceptions as
those of Hegel and the post- Kantian idealists in general is plain.
As to arrival at the One by the historical method of Mr
Ward there seems to me to be little reason for hope. We may
not like breaks between the world and its highest reality but
at present there is no continuous path and the intuitions of a
Plato are necessary. . If we are not allowed to make the leap we
shall not arrive. That which divides philosophers into
*M
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natural science method schools and the more idealistic schools
is just the difference as to this leap. Science .ill not t..-ke
it. The idealist dees and thinks it justified. The danger
of those who insist upon keeping by mere particulars of experience
is that they shall always remain just there. They fail to see
that only a superficial knowledge of particulars may be had without
making the grand leap.
Intuition is put forward as the peculiar method of
philosophy . I agree that there is a quality or type of activity
in human knowledge and thinking which is at least akin to intuition
and there is little objection to calling it such. It has the
particular work of discovery, of a certain grasp or apprehension
of the object, of a leap into the unknown . But as an adequate
method it seems to me essentially illegitimate. It i less fitted,
as method ,than any of the more strictly intellectual types of
procedure. Now we are told that by intuition one may put one-
self into the very heart of reality and thus get an absolute
knowledge of it.. It is not said just how it is to be done.
It is not said how we shall recognize what we ha^e achieved or
whether we shall ourselves be distinct from the real in knowledge.
Mystics say not. We ought to have more information if we are
to try seriously to use this method of intuition . But even
supposing that we can project ourselves into the movement of
living reality by an intuitive effort I fail to understand what
we are then to do. If it mean a cessation of intellectual effort
then the objections to mysticism may be applied to it. If it
does not mean the extinction of the intellect it is quite sure
that the intellect would immediately begin its traditional habit
of analyizing and that would spoil everything. No one seems to
claim to have so projected himself - except the mystic. Some

important change in the number of knowers would take place ,for
knowledge would thus become a very exclusive affair. Concrete
,
detail is surely wanted and would enliven our conception of this
so-called method.
It really seems that the serious proposal of this method
ignores some fundamental facts. In the first place, we have
intellects and are not wholly responsible for being fitted out with
them. It seems that in this life we must even think to survive .
It seems, toe, that we must think about ultimate reality. We
seem to be forced into a certain way of getting along and that way
has as an' essential feature intellectual effort applied to the
problem of reality. It hardly seems possible to help matters
in that regard. It is said that had the initial impetus been
absolute the process of evolution woulu have been forced through
without the embarassment of intellectual obstacles. But if
the fact is what it is we cannot help it since we ourselves are
finite also. I see no way of gaining real knowledge except
in the way marked out and that way most certainly includes the
use of the intellect as a very important factor.
If the difficulty is the desire for genuine and living
knowledge of the real then I would insist that we do have such
knowledge. And it is not a merely intellectual sort of knowledge
either. It is the self knowledge of the I, knowledge of a
somewhat which is itself the real. I grant that this is a very
meager and unsatisfactory knowledge and that it is of no immediate
importance in itself. We want more than this mere somewhat.
This bare xact of a felt whole is not enough. We are social
beings ’and sc situated that a certain development is imperative.
That program includes thinking and all that we have found that to
J'
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iipply with relation to the original somewhat. It sends us on
a long search, a search that is eternally incomplete in its reward
but which' is increasingly rewarded in the enrichment and development
of that very somewhat which is personality. Perhaps the reality
itself is just this eternal search. The intellect is not a
calamity at least. . It is our most efficient instrument and
we need not less nor poorer but more and better intellects.
It is quite usual nowadays to insist on experience in
some form. Sometimes it is meant as the method of finding the
real. Ev ryone apparently wants to be true to experience and
to build upon it. It Is the most tyrannical of criteria. No
one dares to contradict it and sometimes even to question it.
It is even said by many that reality is experience -with a
capital
.
In popular language such phrases these are constantly
heard: "experience is the best teacher" ; "that was a great
experience" '/lack of experience" ; "the experience of the race" ;
"inexperience". Here experience means variously, a living of
real events, of participation in events of which the sensations
and feelings furnish a the peculiar quality, the personal knowledge
or acquaintence with the real , immediate , vital knowledge.
Or it is a knowledge of or skill gained from such actual contact
with the real. It is opposed to the merely imaginary , fanciful
,
and sometimes to the theoretical. In some cases it is tested
knowledge. Or it is the actual demonstration of one's
knowledge. H implies a knowledge that may be possessed and
not used to advantage.
One mark of experience is that of certainty. Whatever
it may mean it carries a feeling of absolute certainty.
'.
1
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One knows absolutely what one has experienced- at least that one
has experienced something. The appeal to experience is supposed
to be an appeal to fact.. It is in this character that science
gains its sway over the imagination. Scientific knowledge is
knowledge derived through experiments. Science is method
applied to experience.
Another mark is that of felt immediacy and personal
ownership. It is immediate as opposed to mediate knowledge,
I suppose this is what is meant by "pure" experience though I do
not know. It is knowledge not about but of the real.
i erhaps the most characteristic mark is that of its
emotional or feeling aspect. An experience is essentially and
in the last analysis something felt or a feeling of something.
This is its strength as an appeal to knowledge. The certainty
of experience is not logical but that of fueling. The sense
element is inseparable from experience in its usual sense.
Now, the procedure of some philosophers is loudly condemned
because they fail to follow experience or perhaps they ignore
experience. The empirical method is he only safe and true
method in gaining knowledge. The particular fact must be
adhered to and attempts to transcend it only lead to barren
abstractions. We cannot know universals ,we can know particulars
only. Perceptual knowledge is the only true knowledge.
Conceptions are used only until perceptions may be substituted.
I suppose that it is the sense element , the immediacy,
the felt certainty which gives the empirical method its importance
in the general popular esteeiju We seem to be more certain of
the brute facts of this world than of the more civilized ones.
Universals are unreal. Only particulars are real, hence stand

- 55 -
by the particulars. Now in the first place, it is logically
impossible to hold to a particular fact. When £ assert it
as an individual I thereby make it universal as being unique.
It is this particular fact as over against all other facts.
It is"here" and "now". Any judgment about a particular fact
is an individual judgment and hence universal. It is
impossible to stay by mere particulars. To assert that there
are only particulars is to make a universal judgment. Thus
we are confused.
If the necessity is to cling to the essentials
,
I
cannot see how we are to get far. For the sensuous has been
analyzed into mere sensati ns or ideas in me and merely perceptual
knowledge gets only a very little way. I cannot perceive very
rouch-~some color , taste , etc . The rest is due to the constructive
activity of the mind. There is very little in empirical
knowledge that is of the sensational character, ^ven the
great facts of science are not sense facts at all, 'Ve depend
very little on brute fact for most empirical knowledge , Most
of it is of the kind that the empiricist thinks dangerous.
One cannot get very far on the road to reality with merely an
empirical knowledge. Experience is worth v ry little in itself.
Its certainty may be very great but it is worth little unless it
hove in addition a conceptual character. Then of course it
was long ago shown that experience itself presupposes the laws
of reason and this is one place where r lato has the better of
his modern critics. The empiricist , however
,
is not expected
to regard this fact as either true or important. Such
rationalism is what he wants to destroy by empiricism,
uiyway experience will have to be taken in a much deeper sense
.'
* •
before it is of the importance insisted upon by empiricists.
Perhaps this deeper meaning of experience is what
Mr James means to offer in what he calls "pure experience'.
This presumeably is meant to be something other than plain
everyday experience. Or at lea^t it should be distinguishable
from such either by refinement or by some sort of purification.
Well , experience I know and consciousness, but "pure" experience
looks suspiciously like a highly speculative hypothesis in which
all that James loved in the particular facts of life is left out,
It seems to me to be the result of an attempt to raise mere
sensuous and perceptual knowledge to the plain of philosophical
-knowledge and an abandonment of his essential contention. The
Ideas of Plato are not more rarified ..or less concrete than
this "pure"exper i ence .
We are told that there is only one kind of primal stuff
of which everything is composed and "....if we call that stuff
'pure experience', then knowing can be easily explained as a
particular sort of relation of one another into which portions of
pure experience may enter". "The relation itself is a part of
pure experience". (Radical Empiricism, James, b -4.) idge , th
is a relation and this relation is a matter of pure experience
and the knowledge of this relation as being a matter of pure
experience is also a relation and a matter of pure experience also.
So runs the world away. Now the knowledge which is so easily
understood as being only a particular kind of relation between
oits of this pure experience is itself nothing but a bit of
pure experience. The idea, then, has no reference beyond itsel.f
nor does it transcend itself,
of emporal order of events.
It is merely a link in a chain
But how do we know that reality
I<u
V
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is-- as Janies holds -- just the temporal order' of events unless
knowledge ranscends that order itself? We not only have a
knowledge of particular events but of an order of those particular
events. And furthermore the knowledge of this order" and
succession of events is itself merely a relation existing between
bits of pure exoerience, which is also its; If a bit of pure experience.
How -then on this theory can -we experience order or succession ?
Do we actually experience this order and succession of events in
addition to the events themselves, James holds that the
relations and the terms are equally matters of pure experience
and that change itself is an ultimate factj which of course must
be known and the knowing of which is only a particular kind of
relation between two bits of pure experience. What then are
the terms of this relation- -the knowledge that change is
ultimate? It is very plain that all this has nothing to do
with particulars and facts and experience which we know as actual.
That we have here a bit of speculation which cannot be surpassed
for barrenness seems evident, "Pure experience" is certainly
something quite different from actual experience. Knowledge
and the method of knowing are quite different, from what we xnow
as the knowledge of experience and the method of gaining experimental
knowledge of actual particular concrete facts and objects, Such
empiricism is certainly radical but so radical that all real
empiricism has long since been quite uprooted. It not only
goes to the root of the matter but it actually, uproots the matter
itself. It is a vicious radicalism.
The radical critic of the intellect and so-called
intellectualism in philosophy and the upholders of the experience
philosophy are very much opposed to conceptual knowledge and
•f
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conceptual thinking. As a substitute they would, offer a purely
perceptual type of thinking or activity. Conception at best
is tolerated only as preliminary to the perception of the real.
Conceptions are due to the infirmity of the flesh. It is the
vice of intellectual ism. Knowledge in conception is not true
knowledge. Only perceptual knowledge is real. We ha’e to use
conceptions , to be sure, but only because according to M. Bergson and
others, our present perceptions do not reach far enough. If our
present perceptual experience were merely extended far enough it
would give us the real as it is in itself. Our whole present
attempt to know the real, then, is vitiated by this falsifying :
intellectual conception.
Upon the view of knowledge suggested above it is quite
unnecessary to assume that conceptions give us complete knowledge
of reality. In fact, the view would not permit such an interpreta
tion. It is distinctly maintained that purely conceptual knowledge
cannot give us the real in its completeness. The real is given in
the highest form in an experience or a type of knowledge which is
more than intellectual conception. An intellectually acquired
knowledge, in so far as it is the work of the intellect itself
is never what we kno a in ourselves reality to be or what we mea :
by the real. In this sense conceptual knowledge is inadequate
and incomplete. I do not want the real wholly conceptualized.
I do not want my experienced reality , the felt somewhat which to
me is the very heart of the real, to be transformed wholly into
conceptions. For I know that then it. would be something alien,
something artificial, some thing rigid, in short a dead reality.
But reality to me is most personal ,most living, most fluid and
is the deepest experience of myself. I ho noi. wan
* this
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changed into symbols
,
pressed into a halting language which others
may read and know that my reality is formal , artificial, and lifeless.
On the other hand I recognize and insist that my chief
mental activity is just to be forever- bringing that life and
reality to expression in conceptions. I cannot help that but
what is more i desire it , I do not want the real to remain a
mere felt somewhat of original feeling. My very nature as a
social self requires that this be so far as possible transformed
into an intel lectualizedy conceptual ized knowledge. I rest
secure and at ease knowing that the infinity of selfhood and
reality can never, by its very nature, be transumted into a conceptual
system and exhibited to the world. I know that the infinite
richness and manifoldness of the real cannot be expressed in symbols--
or at least completely so. 1 know because 1 see every moment
that richness slipping through the lines of -articulation and even
as I write realize that what I mean is more than what I say or
even what I have in conception. Yet I could not say anything
were it not for conceptions.
If this be a grevious contradiction, the only answer is
that such contradiction is the lot of finitude. If the
contradiction could be resolved the richness of the real wou
disappear with it. Consciousness is contracdLic tory and that
because it is both finite and absolute , In its deepest and
ultimate reality it is one with the Absolute Self. But in its
finiteness it is forever leso than that absolute or universal Self.
It is this contradiction which has forced the minds of mensince
Plato beyond the mere finite self to the absolute viewpoint.
It is clear now what must be said of perceptual knowledge.
As we found in the view of intellect taken by M. Bergson, it is too
»c
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extreme. It ignores actualities of our finite selfhood. No
way is pointed our whereby we may dispense with intellect and
conception. It is admitted that we must use them now , But
no specific way is shown by which human thinking is to be radically
changed. There is too much of an inclination not to accept
what is actual and judge that from Its inherent possibilities.
It seems idle to reject the work of intellect and conception in
the history of thought but if this is not done the actual place
which they fill should be granted and if it is a foreign, mistaken
element in ones make-up it should be explained. It seems better
to accept intellect and conception as valid and essential factors
in human knowledge and to determine their proper significance .
The methods so much emphasi zed, then, seem to be inadequate
to deal with the problem. Present day philosophy would seem
to be suffering, in the first place, from a dominance of the methods
and ideals of natural science. Owing to the dominant influence
of natural science in modern times philosophy has, to a considerable
extent, given up the search for- highest reality. Either
scientific knowledge has been accepted as absolute know ledge . of
the real or else such absolute knowledge is given up as beyond
the reach of the mind. Philosophy will then be a critical
science. But what is this science of critical philosophy?
If it takes its viewpoint . wholly with that of science then there
is no reason for calling it a philosophy. if it criticise
the metaphysical assumptions and the theories of past and present
then it must do so from a metaphysical point of view and loses
4
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its strictly scientific character. For science has nothing to
do with metaphysica assumptions-- except perhaps to remain
ignorant of the swarm of them upon which it itself i- based’. A
critical philosophy would seem to live by virtue of metaphysical
assumptions and theory of the past and present. how there can
be no objection to having philosophers who are primarily critics
Criticism is necessary but it is quite a different thing, that such
critics should insist upon appropiating the whole field of
philosophy for a purely critical science. U .less some one
does constructive work there will be no field for criticism and
thus, if his ideal were realized, the critic would cut off his
own subject-matter.
The basis and the weakness of all such types of philosophy
is that ah essential element in human thought is ignored.
PhilOoOpers must be constructive as well as critical unless their
work is to remain purely negative. And this constructive
activity depends upon that object which the criticist ignores.
The criticist may base his philosophy upon a narrow, incorrect
view of knowledge. The merely intellectual is assumed to be
the only valid element in reason and knowledge. No , "demands
"
of the moral consciousness or other elements of our nature are
valid for the criticist. They are only postulates and yet
Kant himself held the dictates of moral consciousness as absolutely
binding and authoritative and in reality accepted them as true of
r ality. How else could they be accepted if not as true?
There seems little doubt that Kant shut himself out from acceptance
of metaphysical truth as the basis of a certain view of knowledge
which is not wholly valid. But this refusal to accept such
knowledge was only formal for he did in fact accept it as knowledge
rf
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No one can act on that which he does not accept as true if he
have Kant's honesty. And if a thing is accepted as true of
reality and acted upon it cannot be said, to be anythin?? but
knowledge for that person. That which is taken as true for us
and not that which we can demonstrate as true makes up our
knowledge
.
We mpst conclude therefore that the first requisite of
any proper method must recognize the presence of other than
purely intellectual elements in the knowledge process. It is
the ignoring of this which is the fundamental weakness of most
methods in philosophy. This is the chief result of this
discussion and the star-ting point for the suggestion of an adeouate
method
.
The knowledge process, it seems to me, has two fundamental
aspects , based on two types of menial activity. These two
aspects may be termed discovery and analysis. The former is
based primarily on the more strictly non- intellectual activity of
the mind. The latter* is the characteristic work of the more
purely intellectual type of activity. These are not isolated
the one from the other . But when we look at the mind's action
we can see these two methods of procedure. They are are, perhaps
better, the ways in which the mind does somewhat different kinds
of work.
Analysis is more evident to us since it is that activity
which brings the real to us in symbols. It is primarily the
making of knowledge communicable ,and hence clearly conscious to
ourselves. Its fundamental quality is clearness , distinctness
,
sharpness in outline and detail, precision etc. It is this
type of activity which gives us scientific knowledge in its
ff
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finished, social, practical or usable character. It can ,-'ork
only with the material on hand. It cannot discover new
material of knowledge; it is not constructive or creative.
Discovery, on the other hand, is much less tangible.
It gives us material with which analysis works. It is the
method or type of activity which makes progress in new truth
possible. It is the more original , closer to the living, akin
to intuition, imagination, feeling, and insight. Here belong the
great intuitions of science, the discovery of great truths and
formation of grand hypotheses. Here belong also the mystical
types of knowing, the intuitions oi genius, etc. Analysis
cannot make leaps. These are made by the type of activity
which we here term discovery. Analysis works with the given,
the given itself is acquired by this process of discovery.
This type of activity never results in a formulated system of
knowledge
;
that is the work of the intellect as such. Hence
its knowledge is private and is made a social knowledge by the
activity oi' the intellect.
It is this type of activity which is so commonly ignored.
And yet without it the other type is impossible because it depends
upon this. That it is unformula ted , intangible is not proof
that it is not also fundamental. It is the basis of all
activity and the source of our faith. Convictions and practical
certainties are also based on this. It is this which gives to
knowledge its living , vital
,
personal character.
•*110 method of philosophy then is a combination of these
two fundamental forms of mental activity , Thus combined it
may preferably be called reflection ,yet it must be clearly
understood that this oflection is not a formal manipulation of
fms
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concepts but includes both discovery and analysis.
really one activity but made up of two different forms, one or the
other of which may predominate un.er different circumstances.
In general the analytic activity will appear the mos; common and
evident because of its very nature. But nevertheless there is
always the other element present. ' Ref lecti on , thus understood,
is not a merely Intellectual activity but is pervaded by this more
living and personal form of activity,, *Bince the analytic consists
more ir. the outlines and the element of discovery more of the living
character which fills out these outlines, the former will necessarily
be more tangible ,mor@ evident to oneself and to others. But
the inrrumeralbe ,the almost unconscious intuitions which
accompany all reasoning , the peculiar fascinating enjoyment in
the most abstract performances 01 the intellect such as in /for
instance /mathematical speculations, the reaching out into the
dark for that which we only believe to be there, the felt certainties,
the faiths which tide us over trackless waters
,
the longings for
that which is n<bt a known possession but which ought to be, the
insistent demands of various elements of our nature and the
unshaken convictions of the soul, all these have their basis in
the activity which in its recognizable form we cal discovery.
It is the type whose significance in knowledge needs to be
understood and used if possible.
Now, if the method of reflection suggested here is important
it will matter little where one begins or tries to begin, whether
with one of many~-one must always finally come back to the self
nd to consciousness and the experiences of
^
the self. Thus in
reality the beginning io not really with the particular thing or
with an abstract One as some imagine but with consciousness itself.
I*
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^•ttempts to begin otherwise will prove to be only preliminary
skirmishes the real attack being possible only when consciousness
is the starting point,
When one begins with reflection upon consciousness and
the experiences of the self one will easily discover , it seems
to me , the presence of other than purely intellectual activities
in the knowledge process. And if such an activity as that which
has been called discovery is found ,an effort should be made to
find its true significance. One would then give consideration
to claims of intuitionists, artistic and religious genius fundamental
demands ,and convictions of human nature. Their significance
should be determined. If additional categories should be
discovered one should proceed accordingly and not ignore them.
Reflection upon consciousness will quite surely carry
one beyond them and here the ultimate character of the real will
be inquired after. It is in this more metaphysical task that
the type of activity which may be called discovery will be found
most useful, and also /hen,- it will be most abundantly justified.
It should be used constantly and the result criticised with the
consciousness of the part such non- Intel lee tual elements may have
played. Only then will the significance of the results of
philosophical activity be seen and only then will it be possible
to value them for what they are worth.
It is my contention that philosophy halts because it
assumes formally that nothing but pure intellect counts and yet
at the same time it used, in some cases unconsciously , much that is
non-intellectual. As a fact other elements are present and
produce certain results and yet no account is given of them.
They are not properly evaluated . Their significance is not
t»
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understood or inquired into. This, it seems to me, is a species
of dogmatism and vicious too. My first point is that such
dogmatism should be removed, ^hetLer such elements are valid
/' or significant or not they should be examined and a verdict based
upon analysis and its results given. But, I believe , secondly
,
that such non-intellectual elements do not only exist but that
they have determinative effects and that they are in reality
profoundly significant. That which is highest and most
enduring in philosophy results from deeper and more intimately
personal demands than formal intellectual demands, Every
philosophy shows it and to deny it is to remove much that is
fundamental in philosophy . Whether as inte lectualists we
like it or not every true philosopher holds that to be true which
ought be true and that ''ough'tries s is not merely or mainly an
intellectual demand. The philosopher may make himself believe
that his philosophy is merely an affair of his intellect but in
this he mistakes his philosophy for the reasons or the formula
what intellect gives him. However
,
this should not discourage
him from attempting to give the best reasons or formula for the
faith which is in him.
v The method of philosophy, therefore, must be conscious
of this fact of knowledge in the knowledge process. The
method must include a conscious use of such non- intellectual
elements . This , we have tried to show, will be a combination
of analysis and discovery which may be termed reflection. This
reflective method will be applied to consciousness and its
relation to the world of experience. For the real world
must be sought in the self and its world. The frank acceptance
of such an element in one's method would permit the philosopher
,
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t-o voice the highest and. best demands of Xif s without 1 c.ari..g
that he is unphilosophical . This would in turn do away with
much of the barrenness and formalism of philosophy and also
serve as a basis for those who find something in life and in
reality too high and too precious to oe sacrificed because it is
demanded by out deepest nature and hot discoveralbe by intellectual
analysis. 'Ahen this is done philosophy may be permitted to
shake oif its natural science servility and return to its true
mission of an earnest and courageous search for highest truth
and reality »
i
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